This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets.
Introduction
Economic integration, be it regional or global, has always been accompanied by the notion that it will trigger competition and hence that it improves welfare. Such arguments have been raised in relation to European economic integration, but also in connection to closer North American economic cooperation. Examples from this vast literature are Allen et al. (1998 ), Emerson et al. (1992 , Smith and Venables (1988) and Cox and Harris (1985) , all of which based their arguments both on empirical work and on rigorous formal modelling. Yet, a series of papers have questioned the general validity of the notion that integration will be pro-competitive. In particular, when taking account of the possibility of collusive behavior among firms, Davidson (1984) , Fung (1992) , Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) identify situations in which economic integration may be anti-competitive in the sense that a cartel among firms from different countries becomes more stable when trade barriers are reduced.
1 The fundamental reasoning behind this perspective is that reduced trade costs not only make a deviation from 1 Davidson (1984) and Fung (1992) , but also Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) , examine settings where a quantity-setting cartel of foreign and home firms competes on the home market, while Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) examine symmetric settings where there is potential interaction on both markets. Furthermore Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) contribute to the previous literature by distinguishing between cartels supported by collusion on prices or collusion on quantities. Recently Bond and Syropoulos (2003) integrate several of these aspects by examining the case of multimarket collusion and the effect on the incentives of cartel members and the impact on welfare.
the (implicit or explicit) cartel more attractive, but also reduce the cost of punishment and hence make the severity of a punishment -when breaking the collusive agreement -harsher. In sum, these two effects may well increase rather than decrease the stability of the cartel.
This paper augments the literature by examining the robustness of the latter argument in relation to a differentiated modelling of trade barriers, and hence economic integration.
2 In particular, a distinction among ad valorem, unit and fixed trade costs is introduced into a setting where two firms situated in two different countries have formed a cartel that prohibits exports into each other's home markets. It is shown that a clear anti-competitive effect from economic integration is confined to a reduction in unit trade costsand here it occurs for a cartel supported by collusion on prices but not for a cartel supported by collusion on quantities. Integration, consisting of reductions in ad valorem or fixed trade costs, will be pro-competitive or at least neutral independent of the mode of collusion (price-versus quantitysetting). However, there exists a region of high ad valorem trade costs where an initial cost reduction may increase the stability of a price setting cartel.
Yet, a pro-competitive region will be reached for a sufficient cut in trade costs.
2 The previous literature focuses on the case of unit trade costs. In addition to a unit trade cost Matschke (1999) examines quotas and the impact from quota reductions on cartel stability. Earlier Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) Baier and Bergstrand (2001) , Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996), McCallum (1995) , Harrigan (1993) . Since different cost types affect agent and firm behavior in potentially different ways, the inclusion of a distinction between different costs in the formal modelling of economic integration appears to be an important step, see for example Jørgensen and Schröder (2003) .
The simple distinction into ad valorem, unit and fixed trade costs used in the present paper is motivated as follows: First, ad valorem trade costs consists of items such as tariffs, insurance costs, or exchange rate risks. Second, unit trade costs could include transport costs or specific tariffs. 3 Third, fixed costs are market access costs such as the cost of product certification or adjustments to local regulation, the costs of maintaining a distribution network abroad, or foreign red tape in general. The Single European Act in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides an example of a policy tackling barriers of the fixed trade cost type, whereas the early years of European integration dealt with the removal of (mostly ad valorem) tariff barriers. Similarly, the introduction of a common currency like the euro can be viewed as a reduction in ad valorem trade costs (see for example Rose (2000) ). Furthermore, trade liberalisation under the governance of the WTO mainly addresses tariff cuts. Nevertheless, global trends in reduced transport costs and cross-border hauling fees must be viewed as reductions in unit trade costs.
The basic model used in the present paper is that of Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) , which in turn is related to Pinto (1986 Furthermore, see Matschke (1999) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) , but also Fung (1992) and Bond and Syropoulos (2003) , for reference to cases where such cartel structures may be relevant.
ported by collusion on prices. In this context anti-competitive means that the range of discount factors that suffice to maintain the cartel is widened, i.e. the cartel is strengthened. This finding is reproduced in the present paper for the case of unit trade costs, but not for ad valorem or fixed trade costs. Thus, the impact of economic integration on cartel stability is shown to depend also on the type of trade barrier that is tackled by the integration process.
The following section introduces the formal model. Section 3 presents the results for the different cost types. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
Consider a homogeneous good duopoly, where firms are based in separate countries, a and b. Production is characterised by constant returns to scale and marginal costs are normalised to zero. Exporting to the respective foreign market, that is, trade between a and b, is associated with ad valorem trade cost, τ , with unit trade cost t, and fixed cost f . 5 The following restrictions apply: τ < 1, to ensure a positive prices when exporting, t < p M , where
The fixed cost f is assumed to occur in each period in which trade is conducted, which appears to be the case when maintaining a distribution network or dealing with foreign red tape. If, however, fixed costs to trade are understood as a one-off event instead, then this would simply be the net present value of paying f over time. What matters for our result is that these fixed costs to trade are neither associated with the price of goods nor with the quantities traded.
p M is the price of a monopolist, and f < π M , where π M is the profit of a monopolist. Further joint and individual feasibility-of-trade restrictions on τ , t and f are specified below. Economic integration is taken to consist of reductions in these trade costs. The demand function -identical in both markets -is
In order to maximise the joint cartel profit the two firms have colluded to restrict their sales to their respective home markets. Thus in the status quo there is no trade and both firms act as monopolists on their domestic market (cartel phase). It is assumed that the cartel is supported by grim trigger strategies. If one of the firms breaks the collusive agreement by deviating and exporting into the respective foreign market (deviation phase), the cartel collapses and firms attempt to export into each other's markets. 6 Thus, the static noncooperative Nash outcome will be the resulting equilibrium for all subsequent periods (punishment phase).
Profit expressions π jk are derived, where j denotes the mode of competition, and k denotes the different phases. The possible modes of competition are competition on prices, B, or competition on quantities, C. The different phases are M for the cartel phase, i.e. both firms act as monopolists, D for the deviation phase, i.e. the profits of the attacking firm, and P for the punishment phase, i.e. profits when the duopoly is in the noncooperative equilibrium. It turns out to be useful to calculate profits when both ad valorem trade costs, τ , and unit trade costs, t, are present at the same time, while the case of fixed trade costs f is treated separately below.
While the cartel is maintained (2), each firm acts as a monopolist on its domestic market, charging the profit maximising price on its home market. When the firms are quantity-setters, the foreign firm persists during the attack in its quantity 
which simplifies to the expression in (3).
When firms are price-setters instead, the deviating firm again harvests profits of 1 4
on its home market. In addition, on the foreign market the attacker can capture total sales by marginally under-pricing the other firm.
Yet, the trade costs of exporting the quantity When firms are price-setters, the punishment phase does not feature any realised exports. However, the threat of foreign exports after the cartel has collapsed, i.e. attempted exports, forces domestic firms to price marginally 7 If the condition 1 > τ + 2t is not fulfiled, the two countries are in fact insulated from competition, such that there is no need to form a cartel in the first place.
below the lowest possible import price associated with non-negative profits for the foreign firm. The foreign firm's profits from exporting are (1−τ )p(1− p)−t(1−p), setting this expression equal to zero and solving for p determines the price associated with zero export profits as
, which in turn is the highest possible price the domestic firm can charge on the home market while still avoiding any imports. The resulting profits are as stated in (6).
Parallel to the above, the case of fixed trade costs f can be examined.
Denoting profits when there are only fixed costs to trade byπ jk , one can state:π
The profits while the cartel persists are, as before, the profits of a monopolist (7). Deviating from the collusive agreement does, under the presence of a fixed trade cost, result in profits (8) and (9). In the Cournot case, the attacker maximises its profits given that the attacked firm persists in its quantity 1 2
, while in the Bertrand case, the attacker can capture the entire foreign market by marginally under-pricing the foreign firm. In both instances, the attacker encounters the fixed costs of exporting f . Also from (8) it follows that f < 1 16 must hold in order for an attack -and thus trade -to be feasible.
After the collapse of the cartel (punishment phase), given that firms compete on quantities, both firms set quantities 1 3
on the home and foreign market respectively, the resulting price which is identical on both markets is However, in order to conduct the exports, there is still the fixed trade cost f .
When firms are competing on prices instead, actual exports do not materialise. Instead, the domestic firm sets it price at a level associated with zero profits for imported goods, so as to avoid any import activity. The profits from export activity are p(1 − p) − f , which after setting the expression equal to zero defines the price on both markets in the punishment phase sold by each firm on its respective home market. Calculating the profits results in the intuitively obvious conclusion that the profits that are possible are exactly the value of the fixed costs to exports (11), i.e., if the home firm made any profits above f , this would immediately trigger export activity of the foreign firm.
Results
Cartel stability in this setting is an evaluation of situations where the initial collusive agreement becomes easier or more difficult to maintain. Formally, one investigates the range of the common discount factor δ for which collusion will remain unchallenged. Since in all settings calculated above the profit for a cartel member, i.e. the monopolists profit, is less than the profit from deviation, but larger than profits in the punishment phase, there must exist some δ * such that for δ < δ * the threat of the punishment phase becomes so small, that a member of the cartel will abandon the collusive agreement in favor of the short term gains in the deviation phase. Hence, an investigation of cartel stability must examine how δ * reacts to changes in the various trade costs. In particular, widening the range of δ where collusion is supported,
i.e. a reduction of δ * , implies that the cartel is strengthened. Conversely, widening the range of δ where the collusive agreement will be challenged by deviation, i.e. increasing δ * , implies that the cartel is weakened.
Both firms will support collusion, i.e. the cartel is sustained, if
is fulfiled. Solving (12) with equality after inserting the values from the above profit expressions determines δ * .
Ad valorem trade costs
Plugging (2), (3) and (5) into (12) 
How does a change in ad valorem trade cost τ affect δ * C τ t , i.e. the lowest discount factor for which the collusive agreement is still sustainable? Differentiating (13) with respect to τ gives
which is always negative since 4t(1 − τ ) > 4t 2 due to the trade feasibility condition 1 > τ + 2t. Thus as τ decreases, δ * C τ t increases, implying that the range of δ where collusion is sustainable is reduced. Or put differently, economic integration that consists of a reduction in ad valorem trade costs reduces the stability of a cartel supported by collusion on quantities, i.e.
integration is pro-competitive.
The case of Bertrand competition is obtained when plugging (2), (4) and (6) into (12). The critical δ * B τ t becomes
Differentiating (15) with respect to τ gives implies that the range of pro-competitive τ levels is empty.
Unit trade costs
Since both ad valorem and unit trade costs are present in (13) and (15), these critical values for δ can be used directly to examine the case of unit trade costs.
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When firms are competing in quantities, how does a change in unit trade cost t alter δ * C τ t ? Differentiating (13) with respect to t gives
which is always negative. Namely, the lowest discount factor for which the collusive agreement under Cournot competition is still sustainable increases when unit trade costs are reduced. Thus economic integration is pro-competitive.
When firms compete on prices the situation changes. Differentiating (15) with respect to t yields
which is always positive. Hence, an increase in t increases δ * B τ t , implying that the range of parameters where the collusion is sustainable shrinks, i.e.
the cartel is weakened. Accordingly, economic integration which consists of a reduction in unit trade costs does strengthen a cartel operating under
Bertrand competition, i.e. integration is anti-competitive.
Fixed costs to trade
Finally, consider the effect of reductions in fixed costs on cartel stability.
Plugging (7), (8) and (10) into (12) the critical δ * C f for the case of Cournot competition and the presence of fixed costs to trade is calculated to be
Differentiating (19) with respect to f gives, − 144 13
, which shows that the lowest discount factor for which the collusive agreement is sustainable increases with a reduction in f , hence the cartel is weakened.
For Bertrand competition the critical δ is obtained when plugging (7), (9) and (11) into (12); it turns out to be identical to the textbook (zero transport costs) case of Bertrand collusion:
The intuitive conclusion is, that the increased profitability from a cut in fixed trade costs f by amount y not only enters directly with value y into the profit of the attacking firm, but also enters the profits in the punishment phase with value −y. Thus the effect is neutralised, and we return to the threshold value of sustainability of collusion
. This implies that under price competition, economic integration that reduces fixed trade costs has a neutral effect on cartel stability.
Discussion
Among the various results from above we will elaborate on two: first, the opposing impact of a unit trade cost reduction under Cournot and Bertrand competition; and, second, the opposing effects of ad valorem versus unit trade cost reductions.
Concerning the first point, an anti-competitive effect of unit trade cost reductions under Bertrand competition but a pro-competitive effect under
Cournot competition, i.e. the finding of Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) , the following intuition applies. What happens in the case of a unit trade cost reduction under Bertrand competition is that even though a reduction in t makes a deviation from the collusive agreement more attractive, it also increases the severity of the punishment. In sum, the punishment effect dominates. Under Bertrand competition in the punishment phase the trade costs are the only market protection left for the home firm after the cartel is abandoned, while under Cournot competition in the punishment phase, the strategic interaction ensures that even though reduced trade costs cause losses on the home market, they create profit gains on the foreign market since both firms service both markets.
Consider now the finding that effects from unit and ad valorem trade cost reductions differ. In particular, under Bertrand competition a sufficient ad valorem trade cost reduction is pro-competitive, while any unit trade cost reduction is anti-competitive (see (16) and (18)). A crucial difference between these two cases is in the profits during the punishment phase as given in (6). Differentiating with respect to t and τ gives
(1−τ ) 2 and
(1−τ ) 2 respectively. Both expressions are positive, hence a cut in trade cost reduces profits in the punishment phase. However since t < 1 − τ holds, profits in the punishment phase react less severely to reductions in ad valorem trade costs than to reductions in unit trade costs. More intuitively, there are two fundamental forces at work: (i) in all scenarios prices in the deviation phase are high, while prices in the punishment phase are low; (ii) trade cost reductions increase the deviation price from the firms perspective but reduce the price it can maintain during the punishment phase. A unit trade costs reduction -even though it means a price rise in the deviation phase -has a severe cost in the punishment phase, were the trade cost is the only protection available to the firms under Bertrand competition. On the other hand, an ad valorem trade cost reduction adds much to the payoff in the deviation phase, where prices are high, while it costs relatively little in the punishment phase were -since prices are depressed anyway -a further ad valorem reduction makes little difference. This "softer" effect on the punishment prices and profits cushions the threat from export retaliation such that with ad valorem trade cost reductions the profit gain in the deviation phase can be attractive enough to trigger an attack on the cartel. 
Conclusion
The paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of an international duopoly to maintain a cartel that prohibits exports into each other's markets. Such a cartel can ensure monopolistic profits for the participating firms, but is under a constant threat of deviation. However, the temptation to break the cartel is counterbalanced by the threat of reverting to the non-cooperative equilibrium with open competition on both markets.
Since reductions in trade barriers make deviation more attractive, but can increase the severity of a punishment at the same time, there may exist situations in which integration has an anti-competitive effect. This type of effect has, for example, been presented by Davidson (1984) , Fung (1992) and Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) , and has been taken to constitute counterexamples to the popular notion that integration will promote competition.
Based on the framework of Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) Thus only policies that tackle unit cost trade barriers are potentially anti-competitive. To sum up, this paper has shown that a conclusion as to whether economic integration is pro-or anti-competitive must also distinguish the type of trade barriers that are tackled.
